Intersezioni | 2026 | N. 1

Through some political dramas that emerged from early modern European courts, this study frames the ideologies of scenic situations in which the counsellor – a central figure within the system of characters – performs the attempt to govern the political secret. Evolving from the typology of compassionate spectator, he responds to the prince with activistic advises. These situations are often performed by refunctionalizing a legacy of political reflections elaborated in courts, in a time marked by spiritual uncertainties, juridical transformations, and war.

Among the writings of Benedetto Croce, the “Why We Cannot Not Say We Are «Christians»” (1942), is perhaps the best known and most discussed. Croce does not hesitate to emphasize the Christian roots of Europe. However, he is silent about Novalis’ “Die Christenheit oder Europa”. It is, in any case, a silence for which it is easy to identify the reasons. There is instead another silence of Croce’s that raises stronger questions: the one, already in the 1930s, on the papal encyclical “Mit brennender Sorge” (1937). A very harsh encyclical in the condemnation of National Socialism. Croce was equally harsh, and already from the early 1930s, in his condemnation of Nazi neopaganism. However, he will never associate his condemnation with that of the papal encyclical. He continues to remain silent about it even during the war years. Nevertheless, at the end of the war, in the face of the horror of the massacres of Nazi neopaganism, he wanted – in an enlightening note added to the new edition (1945) of the 1942 paper – to reiterate with new emphasis, against all neopaganism, the reasons why we cannot but call ourselves «Christians».

This article examines whether it is meaningful to speak of an essence of philosophy in Islam. Rather than proposing a fixed definition, it approaches philosophy through its historical manifestations and internal debates. By analyzing modern controversies as well as classical philosophical testimonies, the study argues that philosophy in Islam cannot be reduced to either rationalism or spirituality alone. Instead, it emerges as a historically dynamic practice that integrates rational inquiry, ethical formation, and reflection on existence. Philosophy in Islam is thus best understood not as a unified doctrine, but as a mode of inquiry whose contours become visible through its concrete historical expressions.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the historical development of Islamic philosophy in the Republican era (since 1923), which has emerged as a distinct research field since the establishment of the Dârülfünûn (The House of Sciences). To this end, the article first examines the evolution and institutional framework of Islamic philosophy as an academic discipline by analyzing the prominent figures and institutions that have shaped this process. The following section explores the intellectual, social, and political factors that determined Islamic philosophy scholarship. Finally, the article concludes with an analysis of the dominant orientations and key debates in Islamic philosophy studies.

Scholars repeatedly lament the absence of studies on modern Arabic philosophy in Western academia. This paper responds to this lament by presenting the contributions of a particular group of academics: the Bern School of Research on Modern Arabic Philosophy, centered around the Islamic Studies scholar and historian of philosophy Anke von Kügelgen and her students and colleagues at the University of Bern and beyond. It introduces this school’s main scholars and their works and describes its main features and variances with regard to assumptions, methods, and objectives in studying modern Arabic philosophy. It posits that this school’s efforts complement recent contributions in the English language research.

This article gives a detailed analysis of a recent engagement by the Moroccan philosopher Abd al-Rahman Taha with the theory of normativity put forward by the American moral philosopher Christine Korsgaard. Following an introduction to Ṭāha’s philosophy, the article surveys Korsgaard’s theory as articulated in “The Sources of Normativity” (1996), which builds on different strands within the Western ethical tradition, most prominently Kant’s transcendental argumentation. The main aim in this book is to answer the «normative question», namely the question why the following of any norm is incumbent on humans. Subsequently, the article details Taha’s rejection of Korsgaard in volume 2 of “Ethical Concepts” (2021) based on his own Islamically inspired ethical theory rooted in a concept of «entrustment». From this perspective Taha faults Korsgaard for what he takes to be her incoherent secularist and Enlightenment preconceptions. The article concludes that while Taha’s analysis is interesting for opening a direct discussion of ethics at a global level from a position that is explicitly informed by his own Arab-Islamic tradition, his neglect of the function that transcendental argumentation fulfills for Korsgaard, fundamentally distorts her argument. Although this does not dismiss the potential of his theory for formulating a contemporary moral framework, the article does argue that such a theory can only make good on its promise if it considers rival theories charitably and exhaustively.